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Eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell and John W. R. Phillips 
 
This study is part of a larger project examining how and whether older workers in poor 
health might use Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) as a path out of the labor market 
(Mitchell and Phillips, 2000).  This topic is an important one, to the extent that proposals to raise 
the age at which people become eligible for early Social Security benefits will alter the 
opportunity set available to older workers.  Indeed, it is possible that raising the early retirement 
age might induce some older people to apply for DI benefits in lieu of waiting to receive delayed 
Social Security retirement payments.  We therefore seek to explore potential spillovers of a 
possible policy change involving raising the early retirement age under OASI.  This is of policy 
interest since many on the verge of retirement are in poor health, and hence some may be likely 
to spill over onto DI rolls if Social Security early retirement ages were raised.  Identifying the 
characteristics and socioeconomic composition of those who can and cannot apply for DI, those 
who do apply but are rejected, and those who appeal, can provide policymakers with insight 
regarding the well-being of the “at risk” population.1 
The present paper seeks to address one question on this larger research agenda, namely, 
who is insured for DI versus who is not in late middle age.  We further investigate what 
differences these two groups of people exhibit in terms of socioeconomic and health 
characteristics.  We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked with administrative data 
to evaluate peoples’ insured status by sex and marital status.  Our research shows how the 
                                                 
1 Previous studies on DI application and acceptance patterns include Benitez-Silva et al. (2000), Dwyer et al. (2000), 
Kreider and Riphahn (2000), Leonesio et al. (2000), Borsch-Supan (1999), Bound and Burkhauser (1999), Hu et al. 
(1997), Gruber and Kubik (1997), Burkhauser et al. (1996), Haveman and Wolfe (1984a,b), and Parsons (1980) 
among others. 
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aspects of the SSDI formulas for insured status can leave different population subgroups subject 
to non-coverage at various stages in their lives. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The analysis uses data from the nationally representative Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), a panel study of older American households first interviewed in 1992 when they were 
age 51-61 (along with their spouses of any age).  In this research, we focus only on baseline 
information though in other work we follow them through additional interview waves.  The HRS 
survey contains extensive and detailed information on demographic, health, wealth, income, and 
employment data for respondents and their spouses.  It is particularly appropriate for our 
purposes since the respondent records can link to administrative data on Social Security earnings 
and pension plan provisions.  This linkage allows us to compute respondents’ eligibility status 
for benefits as well as the likely benefit amounts that a worker might receive. 
In the present research, we limit the analysis to those who were initially interviewed in 
1992 and exclude those who were 60 or older.2  We further limit the sample to those having 
linked Social Security earnings records; previous research has indicated that this sample 
reduction does not produce a biased sample (Levine et al., forthcoming [b]).3  A final sample 
restriction limits the analysis to respondents who had not received DI prior to the onset of the 
survey in 1992.  This restriction is imposed to ensure that we are examining workers actually in a 
position to elect between early retirement and other pathways out of the labor market at older 
ages.  Our ultimate sample size for analysis data set is 6,833. 
                                                 
2 This age restriction is imposed since after people turn age 65 they are no longer eligible for early retirement – and 
they could have turned 65 in 1996 or 1997, hence being at least age 66 in 1998. 
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Our empirical analysis proceeds in steps.  First we combine administrative records and 
HRS files to derive each person’s work path and lifetime insured status for Social Security 
purposes.  Using this information, we next explore the age patterns of coverage for both old-age 
(OASI) and disability (DI) coverage.  Finally, we investigate the socioeconomic and health 
characteristics that predict who is, and who is not, covered for DI on the verge of retirement.  We 
find that some older people in poor health are not eligible for DI and remain persistently 
ineligible over their worklives. Our analysis sheds some light on the work patterns leading to this 
outcome. 
 
Who Is Eligible for DI and Who Is Not? 
Many older American workers are insured for both old-age and DI benefits, but coverage 
is by no means universal (Mitchell and Phillips, 2000; Levine et al. forthcoming [a]).  This is 
because Social Security rules require that workers must contribute for a long enough period in 
order to be “fully insured” for old-age benefits, and a somewhat separate set of rules is applied to 
determine whether someone is “disability insured”. 
Contributions are made in the form of payroll taxes on earnings from Social Security 
covered employment.  A worker earns Quarters of Coverage (QC) based on annual payroll 
contributions.4  Being fully insured for retirement benefits requires the worker to have a number 
of QCs equal to the difference between his current age and 22.  Accordingly, the worker must 
attain at least 40 QC by age 62 to be eligible for retirement benefits.  Once he has accumulated 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 These data have been approved for use by researchers under restricted data use protocols; see 
www.umich.edu/~hrswww for further information. We use all four waves of the HRS currently available in public 
or preliminary release status. 
4 For example, the payroll contribution requirement to attain a QC in 2000 was $780.  Workers can attain a 
maximum of four QC annually.  Though called quarters of coverage, workers can attain all four QC in one calendar 
quarter if their payroll contributions exceed the earnings requirement for four QC ($3,120 at the 2000 QC threshold). 
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40 QC, he is “forever fully insured” (FFI) for retirement benefits.  If he is FFI at age 32, he could 
stop working in covered employment and still claim retirement benefits at age 62.5  To be 
insured for Social Security Disability Insurance or “DI insured,” the worker over age 30 must 
have earned 20 QC during the last 40 calendar quarters ending in disability.6  In other words, at 
any given time, an individual could be both FFI and disability insured, he might be FFI but not 
disability insured, or he could be neither.7 
As a result of these particularities in Social Security program rules, people can move into 
and out of DI eligibility over their lifetimes, depending on their work patterns.  In order to 
explore what fraction of this pre-retirement population is insured for DI purposes, we examine 
the administrative files linked with HRS respondent records available to researchers under 
special restricted access conditions.8  Based on these files, we can assess the FFI and DI insured 
status of respondents over time. 
The resulting eligibility patterns over the worklives of HRS respondents are shown in 
Figure 1 by age and sex.  Results for men (indicated by squares) show that FFI status is low 
among young men, since most have not yet accumulated the 40 quarters of coverage required for 
                                                 
5 Spouses of fully insured workers are eligible for a spousal benefit regardless of their own work history.  Coverage, 
eligibility, and benefit rules relevant to the HRS cohorts in question appear on the Social Security Administration’s 
web page (www.ssa.gov) or in SSA (1992). 
6 Special rules apply to younger workers.  The other requirements to be “disability insured” include (1) having at 
least 6 QC’s and (2) having 1 QC for each year from age 22 to the age of disability (i.e. the worker must be Fully 
Insured). 
7 A worker could be FFI but not DI insured if he had at least ten years of work (so he is FFI) but lost his disability 
insurance status due to periods of illness or unemployment. 
8 Earnings files were obtained for a majority of HRS respondents, namely those providing permission to link their 
survey data with administrative records supplied by the Social Security Administration and also with pension plan 
descriptions provided by respondents’ employers.  In a few cases Social Security benefits could not be calculated so 
the respondent had to be omitted from the analysis.  One reason was that respondents gave permission for the 
University of Michigan to request their Social Security earnings but no match was obtained because the information 
they provided did not match SSA identification information.  Also some age-eligible respondents declined to sign 
the release form permitting their Social Security data to be matched with the HRS (a handful of the very wealthy, 
some Blacks, and some Hispanics did not provide consent).  Omission of non-match cases might bias results if those 
who had a matched file differ from those lacking a match; however our own exploratory analysis as well as analysis 
by Haider and Solon (2000) finds little evidence that results are biased.  More information regarding Social Security 
earnings and benefits data for HRS respondents can be found in Mitchell et al. (2000). 
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OASI eligibility.  During their early 30’s however, the vast majority of men – over 80% –
become fully insured, with the tally inching up to close to 100% later in life.  The disability 
insurance pattern is somewhat different for men.  More than 70% achieve coverage for DI 
purposes by the time they are in their early 20’s, and the rates rise gradually into the mid-40’s 
age range.  After that point, however, DI coverage rates subside somewhat, as work patterns 
become more erratic into the 50s and 60’s.  Lower DI coverage could potentially be problematic 
for this older group, to the extent that older workers tend to have health problems and are often 
more seriously injured when they sustain workplace accidents (Mitchell 1988). 
Figure 1 here 
 The patterns for women (represented by circles) are quite different, as Figure 1 indicates.  
Both sexes start with very low FFI rates at young ages, but whereas men’s rise quickly after age 
25 and asymptote in their 40’s, women’s rise more slowly with age and do not level off, instead 
rising all the way to age 65.  Even at older ages, nevertheless, women are 20 percentage points 
less likely than men to be forver fully insured.  Even more striking is the sex difference in DI 
rates for this sample.  Women’s DI insured status is only 40% in early work life; then it falls 
below this threshold until around age 40, and only rebounds when market work again becomes 
significant in their lives.  After that, women remain much less likely to be insured for DI 
purposes, with the uncovered group of women workers never shrinking below about one-third in 
later life.  Thus these results indicate that working women are less well-protected by Social 
Security disability insurance than are working men due to their more episodic labor market 
attachment.  A substantial subset of both men and women is not DI insured in later life, but the 
gap is more important for women than for men.9 
                                                 
9 Many individuals not covered by SSDI might be eligible for the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI).  
SSI pays benefits to individuals who are either disabled or over age 65 and meet the income and asset tests.  More 
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Differences in FI and DI insurance patterns by sex and marital status are given in Figure 
2 (marital status is measured as of Wave 1 of the HRS survey, so some nonmarried persons were 
previously married).  Among men, there are virtually no differences in coverage patterns by 
marital status, as the figure reveals.  Among women, however, the patterns are distinctly 
different for married and unmarried respondents.  In particular, married women are less likely to 
be DI insured and FFI early in life, and this gap favoring nonmarried women grows after about 
the mid-30s.  Clearly the HRS women not married in their 50’s had substantially more workforce 
attachment during their entire lives, as compared to married women in late middle age.  
Nevertheless, even among the nonmarried women, the peak DI insured rate of just over 70% is 
substantially lower than for men. 
Figure 2 here 
 Three different criteria must be met when determining whether or not a respondent is DI 
insured.  These may be elaborated by focusing on the fraction of people not insured for DI who 
“fail” what we term three “tests” over their worklives.  Accordingly, we define DITest1 as 
indicative of whether the individual has sufficient recent quarters of coverage (i.e. if his age was 
over 30, did he have >=20 QC in last 10 years; if his age was 30 or younger, did he have 
QC>=(age-22)*2).  DITest2 refers to the fully insured condition, indicating whether the 
respondent had enough total QC>=(age-22).  Finally, DITest3 is the most lenient criterion, 
indicting whether the respondent had at least 6 QC by a given age. 
The results for our HRS respondents appear in Figure 3.  For most of the DI ineligible 
respondents, they “fail” due to DITest1, the recency criterion.  Furthermore this threshold proves 
to be a persistent barrier over the worklife, with only a slight drop for people in their 50's.  
                                                                                                                                                             
information on eligibility criteria and benefits for the SSI program can be found in SSA (1992).  In future research, 
we will examine the proportion of those uncovered for SSDI who meet the income and asset criteria for SSI. 
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Therefore not having enough recent quarters of coverage proves to be a substantial barrier to DI 
coverage at all ages, including in the later portion of the worklife. 
Figure 3 here 
 DITest 2 – the fully insured test – applies to almost 30% of both men and women in their 
younger years. In later life, however, this test eliminates fewer and fewer men, but binds for 
increasingly larger numbers of women.  Thus, some 60% of the non-covered women are unable 
to meet the long-term work requirements implicit in the second threshold by the time they are in 
their 50’s and 60’s.  Finally, Figure 3 indicates that DITest3 has the least “bite” for both men and 
women, though the effect is smaller for men (roughly zero) as compared to women (where some 
15% of women do not meet this test even by their mid-60’s).  Again, neither of these effects 
differs markedly by marital status. 
 
Multivariate Analysis of DI Coverage  
To explore the factors associated with being DI insured among the HRS respondents, we 
next provide empirical results of an analysis of coverage patterns.  Here we use a Probit model to 
assess the various contributions of socioeconomic status (age, race and ethnicity, education, sex, 
marital status and history, number of children, income and wealth, and a range of health 
variables ranging from self-reported overall health, to health limitations).  Summary statistics 
appear in Table 1. Inasmuch as Probit coefficients are not particularly informative, we instead 
report the estimated result of response magnitudes evaluated using actual data along with the 
statistical significance level of the underlying coefficients. Results appear in Table 2. 
Tables 1 and 2 here  
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One clear message from the set of models examined is the substantial stability in 
estimates generated.  Thus age has a negative effect on the probability of being DI insured, 
holding constant other factors.10  The marginal effect is such that a one-year older respondent, 
other things constant, would have almost a 1-percentage point lower probability of being DI 
insured versus not.  Married respondents are more than 10 percentage points less likely to be 
covered, even after controlling on other factors.  Having ever experienced a divorce increases the 
probability of being DI insured, while the number of children in the family reduces the 
likelihood of being DI insured.  The impact of being female is negative at -0.22, with relatively 
little variation in estimates across models.  The Hispanic coefficient is negative and significant 
while less than half the female effect; by contrast, the Black coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  Both income and wealth (in natural log form) are positively associated with the 
probability of being DI insured, while having more non-capital income has strong positive effect 
about four times as large as the non-Social Security wealth effect.11 
One of the key features of the HRS is its richness of information on health problems 
facing older Americans.  Accordingly, we explore six measures of health problems intended to 
capture alternative dimensions of older workers’ physical and mental functioning.  First, we 
evaluate a measure widely used by social scientists called here “Health (Poor|Bad),” which 
refers to respondents’ own evaluation of whether their health is excellent, very good, or good 
(tabulated as =0) or fair or poor (tabulated as =1).  Various researchers have suggested this is a 
good measure of HRS respondents actual health status (Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999).  We also use 
a self-report of work preventing disability (=1 if disability prevents work).  Research by Benitez-
                                                 
10 The sample includes only respondents younger than 61 in 1992.  
11 Non-capital income is total household income less income from capital.  Non-Social Security wealth is the present 
discounted value of all wealth less Social Security wealth.  The wealth measure includes the net value of stocks, 
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Silva et al. (2000) implies that this variable is a good predictor of medical eligibility for SSDI.  
Other health variables we examine include a variable summarizing doctor-diagnosed conditions, 
a self-report of work-limiting disability, an identifier for respondent with any ADL difficulties, 
and the respondent’s view of his chance of living to 75 or beyond. 
Table 2 shows that being in poor health is systematically associated with a lower 
probability of the respondent being eligible for DI coverage.  This result is robust to the 
particular health variable elected.  For instance, having self-reported “fair/poor” health is 
associated with 14 percentage points lower chance of being DI covered .  The effect is about the 
same size for people reporting any ADL problem.  Larger negative estimates hold for those 
whom disability limits or prevents work.  Across the board, therefore, older workers suffering 
health problems in later life appear less likely to be insured for SSDI, despite perhaps having a 
greater need for such benefits than their healthier counterparts. 
A question that arises from the multivariate analysis is whether the effects of 
characteristics on DI insured status are the same for men and women.  Intuition suggests that 
many of the results from Table 2 regarding marriage and family issues might differ for the 
women of this cohort.  Furthermore, Figure 2 suggested that eligibility tests have differential 
impacts across the sexes.  Men are not only more likely to be insured for both OASI and DI, but 
also their marital status does not appear to influence their insured status.  To examine this in the 
multivariate framework, we interact all variables in the equations by the FEMALE indicator and 
perform a statistical test (specifically, a likelihood ratio test) to determine whether or not the 
interactions are meaningful.  The results appear in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bonds, checking/savings accounts, CD, businesses owned, IRA, real estate holdings (including residence), vehicles 
owned, employer pensions, and “other” assets. 
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Table 3 here 
Conventional likelihood ratio tests indicate that the augmented model has a better 
statistical “fit” than the simpler equations. Some characteristics do not affect women differently 
than men, but many others do.  As expected, the family structure variables (married, divorced, 
and number of children) are statistically significant with the expected signs for women, but they 
become statistically insignificant for men.  Black and Hispanic women are more likely to be DI 
insured, but the results show that Black and Hispanic men are less likely to be insured.  Though 
poor health still is associated with a lower chance of being DI insured, the effect does not appear 
to work differentially among women. 
The finding that older respondents in poor health are less likely to be DI insured deserves 
further attention.  In order to determine the circumstances of individuals who are both uninsured 
for DI and suffering from health problems, we subdivide respondents according to their DI 
insured status and whether they report a work limiting disability.  Table 4 indicates that nine 
percent of our sample is both work limited and uninsured, and individuals in this group are by 
almost every measure worse off than their counterparts.  They are less likely to have the support 
of a spouse since fewer are married and more report being widowed.  They also report the 
highest incidence of poor health.  Half of those uninsured for DI who also have a work limiting 
disability indicate they are work-prevented because of their health.  Among those who are DI 
insured and report a work limiting disability, only one-quarter report a work-preventing 
disability.  Over one quarter of respondents not insured for DI who report a work limiting 
disability are FFI and state that there disability prevents work.  Finally, those who are uninsured 
and in poor health have substantially lower income and wealth than all other groups. 
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Table 4 here 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
This research asks what fraction of the population on the verge of retirement is, and is 
not, insured for DI purposes, and to the extent determinable, what explains their lack of DI 
coverage.  We find that a substantial fraction of men and an even greater fraction of women is 
not DI-insured in midlife and beyond.  The factors that seem to be associated with higher 
coverage rates are not identical for men and women.  Family structure plays an important role in 
the insured status of women, but it has little effect on men’s insured status.  It appears as though 
marriage and childbearing make women more susceptible to falling out of DI insured status than 
men.  Wealth, income, and good health improve the likelihood of being DI insured for both men 
and women. 
A finding of particular concern is that those in poor health are less likely to be DI insured 
than those in good health.  Our examination of individuals by DI-insured and work limiting 
disability status shows that those who are uninsured and also have a work limiting disability 
experience the lowest level of socioeconomic wellbeing.  Of those who are not DI insured and 
report a disability one quarter are insured for an OASI benefit.  Changes in the early eligibility 
age could reduce the economic well being of those who may not be able to continue work until a 
later date.  Some of those who are uninsured for DI and in poor health might qualify for SSI.  
Determining what fraction that would be covered by the SSI program and the extent to which 
their wellbeing is affected is one of several related topics for future research. 
The next stage of our analysis will examine the subset of people that is DI insured and 
compare them with those who apply for DI.  We will also investigate who is granted DI benefits 
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and how they compare in terms of socioeconomic and health characteristics to those who are 
rejected.12 
While policy implications from these preliminary findings are premature, we feel it is 
reasonable to conclude that a significant number of older working Americans are not covered by 
disability insurance under Social Security.  The size and composition of the group gives rise to 
concern as to how well the safety net works for older infirm workers.  Further, we find that those 
who in poor health are less likely to be DI insured, implying that many in need are not eligible 
for benefits.  This fact is of particular interest given the overall objective of our research.  Any 
approach that attempted to determine medical eligibility for DI without controlling for DI 
insured status could overstate the number of people who are actually insured for DI, and hence 
overstate eligibility for benefits.  In our HRS sample, 65% of those who reported a work-
preventing disability in 1992 were not DI insured in 1992.  Such an omission could lead to an 
important overestimate of those who could claim DI if afflicted by a disability. 
                                                 
12 We further hope to assess whether the results from this analysis are sensitive to the way in which sample attrition 
is handled. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics: HRS Respondents, by Sex 
      
Men Women Variable 
Name 
Variable 
Definition Mean 
Age Age (years) in 1992 55 55 
Married Married (1=yes) in 1992 0.81 0.72 
Ever Divorced Ever divorced  0.34 0.31 
Ever Widowed Ever Widowed 0.04 0.13 
Number of Children Number of Children 3.1 3.3 
Black Black (1=yes) 0.09 0.1 
Hispanic Hispanic (1=yes) 0.06 0.06 
Education Years of Education 12.6 12.3 
Working Working (1=yes) in 1992 0.82 0.63 
FFI1992 40+ Quarters of Coverage in 1992 0.95 0.72 
DII1992 SS Disability Insured in 1992 0.83 0.61 
Health Poor/Bad Self Report Fair/Poor Health 0.16 0.18 
P(Live to 75) Prob. Live to 75 (%) 63.1 66.9 
Diagnosed Conditions Sum Health Conditions 0.99 1.16 
Difficult ADLs  Any ADL difficulties 0.06 0.07 
Work Limiting Disability Disability Limits Work 0.17 0.18 
Work Preventing Disability Disability Prevents Work 0.06 0.07 
  Median 
Non-SS Wealth** HH Total Wealth Less SS $199,828 $171,372 
OASI HH Social Security Wealth $148,670 $151,742 
Non-Capital Income** HH Income Less Capital Income $42,000 $32,000 
Income Total HH Income $46,000 $35,439 
  Observations 
Sample Size Subset of HRS sample* 3,147 3,686 
    
Source: Authors' computations from HRS Wave 1, weighted by HRS sample weights. 
All dollar values in 1992$.    
* Sample contains all age eligible respondents who have a Social Security link, were not 
receiving DI prior to 92, and were under age 67 in 1998. 
**Non-capital income is total household income less income from capital.  Non-Social Security 
wealth is the present discounted value of all wealth less Social Security wealth.  The wealth 
measure includes the net value of stocks, bonds, checking/savings accounts, CD, businesses 
owned, IRA, real estate holdings (including residence), vehicles owned, employer pensions, and 
“other” assets. 
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Table 2:  Probit Estimates of the Probability of being DI Insured  
        
 Dependent Variable: DI Insured at Wave 1 
Explanatory  dF/dx 
Variable (a)  (b) ( c) (d) (e)  (f) 
Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
Married -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* 
Ever Divorced 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 
Ever Widowed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of Children -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
Female -0.22* -0.22* -0.22* 0.21* -0.22* -0.22* 
Black 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Hispanic -0.08* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.08* -0.09* 
Education (yrs) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Health (poor|bad) -0.14* -- -- -- -- -- 
Work Limiting Disability -- -0.21* -- -- -- -- 
Work Preventing Disability -- -- -0.33* -- -- -- 
Diagnosed Conditions -- -- -- -0.05* -- -- 
Difficult ADLs  -- -- -- -- -0.11* -- 
Self-report P(Live to 75) -- -- -- --  0.001* 
Ln(non-capital income)  0.043* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Ln(non-Social Security wealth)  0.011* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 
N=6,833       
LL                           -3733.77 -3683.35 -3673.5 -3732.2 -3747.26 -3642.08 
Pseudo R2  0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Source: Authors' computations from HRS Wave 1, weighted by HRS sample weights. See Table 1. 
Notes: dF/dx computed for qualitative variable changing from 0 to 1.  – signifies variable omitted from 
equation. 
* Indicates Z test rejects underlying coefficient=0 at 95% confidence level.   
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Table 3:  Probit Estimates of the Probability of being DI Insured with Female Interactions  
Dependent Variable: DI Insured at Wave 1 
Explanatory  dF/dx 
Variable (a)  (b) ( c) (d) (e)  (f) 
   Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
   Married 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Ever Divorced 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
   Ever Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
   Number of Children 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   Female -0.75* -0.76* -0.76* -0.75* -0.77* -0.80* 
   Black -0.10* -0.11* -0.09* -0.11* -0.10* -0.11* 
   Hispanic -0.15* -0.17* -0.16* -0.17* -0.14* -0.15* 
   Education (yrs) -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
   Health (poor|bad) -0.14* -- -- -- -- -- 
   Work Limiting Disability -- -0.22* -- -- -- -- 
   Work Preventing Disability -- -- -0.39* -- -- -- 
   Diagnosed Conditions -- -- -- -0.05* -- -- 
   Difficult ADLs  -- -- -- -- -0.16* -- 
   Self-report P(Live to 75) -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 
   Ln(non-capital income) 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
   Ln(non-Social Security wealth) 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.01* 0.02* 
Variable Interactions w/FEMALE 
   Age 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
   Married -0.18* -0.17* -0.17* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* 
   Ever Divorced 0.09* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.09* 0.09* 
   Ever Widowed -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
   Number of Children -0.01* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
   Black 0.13* 0.13* 0.12* 0.13* 0.13* 0.13* 
   Hispanic 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.07 0.08 
   Education (yrs) 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
   Health (poor|bad) -0.01 -- -- -- -- -- 
   Work Limiting Disability -- 0.01 -- -- -- -- 
   Work Preventing Disability -- -- 0.07 -- -- -- 
   Diagnosed Conditions -- -- -- 0.00 -- -- 
   Difficult ADLs  -- -- -- -- 0.09* -- 
   Self-report P(Live to 75) -- -- -- --  0.00 
   Ln(non-capital income) 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
   Ln(non-Social Security wealth) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
N=6,833       
LL                           -3660.31 -3608.76 -3598.14 -3656.46 -3670.73 -3570.41 
Pseudo R2  0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Likelihood Ratio Test (chi sqr)** 146.93* 149.17* 150.72* 151.48* 153.07* 143.32* 
Source: Authors' computations from HRS Wave 1, weighted by HRS sample weights.   
Note: dF/dx computed for X variable changing from 0 to 1.      
* Indicates Z test rejects underlying coefficient=0 at 95% confidence level.   
** Chi square likelihood ratio test between interaction model and model wi thout interactions.  Significance 
      implies improvement in prediction from interaction model. 
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Table 4:  Socioeconomic Characteristics by Self-reported Work Limiting Disability and 
SSDI Insured Status in 1992 
 
 Work Limiting Disability No Work Limiting Disability 
Variables SSDI Insured Not SSDI Insured SSDI Insured Not SSDI Insured 
Demographic (means)     
   Married 0.73 0.65 0.76 0.82 
   Ever Divorced 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.25 
   Ever Widowed 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.09 
   Number of Children 3.43 3.64 3.08 3.37 
   Female 0.43 0.68 0.46 0.74 
   Black 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.08 
   Hispanic 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 
   Education (yrs) 11.72 10.97 12.73 12.40 
   Diagnosed Conditions 1.74 2.26 0.87 0.95 
   Difficult ADLs  0.20 0.43 0.01 0.01 
   Work Preventing Disability 0.26 0.51 0.00 0.00 
   FFI1992 0.99 0.48 0.99 0.39 
   WPD and FFI1992* 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.00 
Income/Wealth (medians)     
   Non-Capital Income $29,650  $15,540  $41,000  $35,000  
   Non-Social Security Wealth $121,371  $57,635  $197,507  $253,080  
Sample Size 644 611 4,179 1,399 
Source: Authors' computations from HRS Wave 1, weighted by HRS sample weights.   
* Respondents who report a work preventing disability and are "forever fully insured" in 1992 (i.e., 40 or more QC). 
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Figure 1: Percent DI and OASI Insured by Age and Sex 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS analysis sample.  All observations weighted by Wave 1 sample weights. 
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Figure 2: Percent DI and OASI Insured by Sex, Age, and Marital Status  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS analysis sample.  All observations weighted by Wave 1 sample weights. 
Variable definitions:  DII=% SSDI insured at age X, FFI=% Forever Fully Insured for retirement benefits at age X 
(i.e. 40+ QC) 
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Figure 3.  Criteria Restricting DI Coverage by Sex and Marital Status  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using HRS analysis sample.  All observations weighted by Wave 1 sample weights. 
Variable definitions: 
DITEST1 % NOT SSDI insured because, at age X: if > age 30, had <20 QC in last 10 years; if <31 had 
QC<(DIage-22)*2. 
DITEST2 % NOT SSDI insured because, at age X, QC<(Diage-22)  [Fully Insured condition]. 
DITEST3 % NOT SSDI insured because QC<6 at age X 
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